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Abstract 
This paper describes the design and implementation of a 
security solution for ad-hoc peer-to-peer communication. 
The security solution is based on a scenario where two 
wireless devices require secure communication, but share 
no security relationship a priori. The necessary require-
ments for the security solution described here comprise 
topics such as energy efficiency, security standards and 
ad-hoc networks. The devised solution is called Access 
Point Security Service (APSS). APSS is able to provide 
security by delivering a symmetric key to two wireless de-
vices that require ad-hoc peer-to-peer communication. 
The main principle of APSS is that it makes use of an ex-
isting security relationship between a network provider 
and its customers. The existing security relationship en-
ables the network provider to deliver security to two or 
more communicating parties in the form of a shared key. 
An implementation of APSS is provided making use of the 
existing Wi-Fi security standards. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile ad-hoc networks allow two or more mobile nodes 
to communicate directly with each other as long as they 
are in transmission range. Communication in an ad-hoc 
network does not require the existence of a fixed, infra-
structure network which provides users a great deal of 
flexibility; everyone is allowed to join and leave the net-
work at will. This flexibility however is, at the same time, 
the cause of security issues as it makes it easier for mali-
cious users to share in the communication.  
This paper considers a scenario that exposes one of the 
security problems regarding mobile ad-hoc networks. The 
scenario comprises of two people meeting each other for 
the first time at a conference. They decide to keep in touch 
during the remainder of the conference using a wireless 
connection between their mobile devices. The communica-
tion between their mobile devices can be considered ad-hoc 
peer-to-peer communication as it connects both mobile 
devices on an ad-hoc basis and does not require compo-
nents from a fixed network. 
Data confidentiality and authentication are normally pro-
vided using cryptographic techniques. These techniques 
are founded on an existing security infrastructure. Security 
is an issue in this scenario however as both persons have 
not established a security relationship yet, making crypto-
graphic techniques impossible or difficult. A security rela-
tionship in this paper signifies the establishment of a 
shared secret. The scenario uncovers a problem that is ap-
plicable to situations where two devices require secure ad-
hoc peer-to-peer communication for their initial contact.  
The paper is structured as follows: chapter two describes 
and compares existing techniques to set up a security rela-
tionship between two devices; chapter three presents a 
newly devised security solution called Access Point Secu-
rity Service (APSS); chapter four describes an implemen-
tation of APSS using the Wi-Fi security standards. 
2. SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
Cryptography is either based on symmetric keys or asym-
metric keys. The cryptographic keys are used for decrypt-
ing and encrypting data and signify a security relationship 
established between sender and receiver. 
2.1. Symmetric key cryptography 
Symmetric key cryptography relies on two or more parties 
sharing a key. Data encryption and decryption are done 
using the same shared key. In a typical configuration a 
sending party encrypts the data with the key before send-
ing and the receiving party decrypts this upon receipt, 
again using the symmetric key. 
The matter in which the encryption/decryption is done 
depends on a symmetric key algorithm. These algorithms 
are of varying complexity and security. It is important to 
understand that the level of security of the algorithm 
greatly depends on the length of the key. Typical symmet-
ric key algorithms are DES, AES and RC4. 
The advantage of symmetric key cryptography lies in its 
relative simplicity. The security of the data relies just on 
keeping the key secret. This simplicity in cryptography 
results in the algorithms being efficient with resources. 
Wireless devices tend to be resource lean devices with lim-
ited battery life and processing power, which makes sym-
metric key cryptography the first choice for this kind of 
communication. 
The disadvantage of symmetric key cryptography is the 
need for some way to securely install the symmetric key in 
the communicating parties. It is difficult to establish a 
common key when no prior security relationship exists 
between two communicating parties. 
Several protocols, called key establishment protocols, exist 
that are used to set up a shared key between two nodes [1]. 
Typical key establishment protocols are Needham-
Schroeder, Kerberos and Otway-Rees [2]. Total security 
architecture SPINS  makes use of SNEP as a key estab-
lishment protocol [3]. All of these protocols require the use 
of a Key Distribution Centre (KDC), a trusted third party 
responsible for distributing the 
keys. The principle of a KDC is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
The disadvantage of using a 
KDC is that it also requires a 
phase where the KDC is set up. 
All nodes using the key estab-
lishment protocols have to reg-
ister with the KDC before-
hand; the nodes have to 
share a secret with the 
KDC to make key establishment protocols work securely. 
2.2. Asymmetric key cryptography 
Asymmetric key cryptography is better known as public 
key cryptography. Unlike symmetric key cryptography, 
there is no requirement for a shared key that has to be set 
up before encryption and decryption is possible. Each 
communicating party holds a key pair, consisting of a pub-
lic and a private key. The private key is a secret key and 
must never be shown to anyone else than the owner. The 
public key however is not secret and is usually advertised 
to anyone interested. Data encrypted by one of the keys in 
the key pair can only be decrypted by the other key. In a 
typical scenario a sending party uses a public key to en-
crypt data. The only party able to decrypt this data is the 
party that possesses the matching private key. Typical pub-
lic key algorithms are RSA, DSA and ECC, of which RSA 
is the most popular. 
The obvious advantage of public key cryptography is that it 
does not require a possibly complex key setup phase like in 
symmetric cryptography; public keys can be sent or adver-
tised in the clear, which makes key setup a breeze. 
One of the disadvantages is related to energy consumption. 
The complexity of the mathematics involved in public key 
cryptography makes it a non trivial business to encrypt and 
(especially) decrypt data. It remains to be seen if all de-
vices can perform these operations. Several papers have 
presented figures about energy consumption regarding 
security solutions, most notably [4] and [5]. The figures 
show that symmetric key cryptography can be up to 1000 
times more energy-efficient than public key cryptography. 
Another disadvantage comes from a security perspective. 
A public key contains no personal information and any 
person can claim to be the person with whom you want to 
communicate by advertising its public key. For this reason 
public key cryptography requires a Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI). A PKI usually involves a trusted third party 
server called a Certificate Authority. This Certificate Au-
thority couples an identity with a public key. This ‘elec-
tronic document’ is called a certificate. A solution based 
on public key cryptography has to take into account that 
connectivity with the Certificate Authority is necessary. 
3. ACCESS POINT SECURITY SERVICE 
The previous chapter has shown that security can be pro-
vided by either using symmetric or asymmetric key cryp-
tography. Symmetric cryptography seems more applicable 
to the scenario outlined in the introduction, given that the 
two persons communicating are using handheld wireless 
devices; energy-efficiency is important to this type of de-
vices. In that case the only remaining issue is of key estab-
lishment.   
It makes sense to try and apply the principles of key estab-
lishment to the scenario mentioned in the introduction. In 
that case one of the two devices at the conference would 
contact a KDC and request a symmetric key for both com-
municating parties using Kerberos or Otway-Rees. Both 
attendees of the conference would have to share a secret 
beforehand with the KDC. The KDC would then create a 
symmetric key for both nodes and send these back en-
crypted using the shared secrets (obtained at registration). 
Both attendees would then be able to decrypt the symmet-
ric key. Secure communication between the two attendees 
would be possible using the established shared key: multi-
hop communication secured by a network layer protocol 
like IPsec and singlehop communication secured by a link 
layer protocol like 802.11.  
Even though this is theoretically possible, it is not very 
likely that KDC servers will be set up in every conference 
hall just for the use of ad-hoc communication. The two 
nodes would also need to register with this KDC before-
hand to establish a security relationship. 
Access Point Security Service (APSS) is a solution that 
makes use of an existing security relationship to create a 
KDC-like functionality for the two nodes. A registration 
phase for a KDC is no longer required when it is possible 
to use existing credentials. APSS is explained in more de-
tail in the next section. 
3.1. Existing security relationships 
Normally, Wi-Fi Internet access via a hotspot requires a 
registration phase where credentials are communicated 
from the wireless service provider to the customer. The 
customer needs these credentials to make use of the hot-
spot services. The assumption of the devised solution is 
now that both attendees of the conference are ‘subscribed’ 
to the hotspot provider. This can be assumed with a high 
degree of confidence as the increase of hotspots in public 
places has become a visible trend. The assumption gains 
even more weight considering that many of the popular 
telecommunication providers are also big players in the 
Figure 1. A Key Distribution 
Centre
hotspot market. Most people already possess a subscription 
with a telecommunication provider and have been pro-
vided with credentials in the form of SIM cards. 
The assumption basically means that the conference atten-
dees share a secret with another party in the conference: 
the wireless service provider. This shared secret comes in 
the form of the subscription credentials. Thus, the wireless 
service provider becomes the trusted third party in the sce-
nario, a KDC.  
The resulting trust model proves to be favourable to the 
considered scenario. The KDC server that is required in 
the key establishment protocols does not have to be a 
newly set up server any-
more. The wireless access 
point already has a security 
relationship with all of the 
nodes (as customers), so 
KDC functionality could 
simply be incorporated. 
This means the hotspots 
could provide a security 
related service, besides 
just providing Internet 
access. This security service is the solution to the problem 
presented in the introduction: APSS (Figure 2). A common 
opinion is that network providers have no role to play in 
ad-hoc communication, but APSS proves that this is incor-
rect. The network providers are in an excellent position to 
provide all kinds of authenticated services from the infra-
structure network to the ad-hoc environment because of the 
existing security relationship with users. Even the case 
where both attendees of the conference have different net-
work providers does not present a problem; roaming 
agreements (for instance in Wi-Fi: [6]) could be used to 
make authentication in a foreign network possible.  
APSS solves the problems that existed with the key estab-
lishment protocols. Initialization and registration phases 
are no longer necessary using the already existing security 
relationship between the network provider and the user. 
3.2. Advantages and disadvantages 
The security solution provided by APSS has many advan-
tages: 
• Both devices do not have to share a security relation-
ship a priori. APSS is able to establish a symmetric 
key to provide security between the two nodes. This is 
especially useful when two nodes have not met before. 
• APSS does not require a solution where a KDC has to 
be set up, but instead makes use of the existing secu-
rity relationship between wireless nodes and their 
wireless network provider. 
• The shared key delivered by APSS can be used for any 
peer-to-peer communication afterwards, thereby mak-
ing the need for availability of an infrastructure net-
work obsolete; the communicating parties can walk 
away from the access points and still keep on commu-
nicating securely with each other. 
• The shared key delivered by APSS can be the starting 
point for many other security protocols. Most of exist-
ing security solutions in ad-hoc networks require a 
pre-shared key to work; APSS provides this. 
• APSS makes use of symmetric key cryptography, 
which is extremely useful in environments where re-
source-lean devices are used. The (one-time) commu-
nication overhead outweighs the energy required for 
public key cryptography. 
There are some side notes to be made regarding APSS 
however: 
• It remains to be seen that APSS principles can be ap-
plied to current network access technologies. The next 
chapter proves it can be done using EAP enabled ac-
cess control, but EAP is currently only actively used in 
Wi-Fi access. 
• APSS requires an infrastructure network to be in 
range of the wireless devices. This will not always be 
the case though. 
Overall, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages and 
therefore the conclusion can be reached that APSS is a 
suitable solution to the security problems associated with 
mobile peer-to-peer communication. 
The next section introduces an implementation of APSS 
using the Wi-Fi standards. 
4. AN 802.11 IMPLEMENTATION OF APSS 
Wi-Fi is a technology based on the IEEE 802.11 standard 
[7]. Initially, the protocol made use of the ill named Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) for both authentication and data 
confidentiality. The flaws of WEP are well documented [8] 
and IEEE therefore brought out a security update to the 
original standard: IEEE 802.11i [9].  
Authentication in IEEE 802.11i has been improved with 
the use of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 
[10]. This protocol is able to incorporate many authentica-
tion protocols by making use of flexible challenge-response 
pairs. Authentication itself is performed by a RADIUS [11] 
(or similar) authentication server. 
Data confidentiality has also been given an upgrade in 
IEEE 802.11i; keying mechanisms like TKIP, CCMP have 
been introduced while encryption itself is done using AES. 
The authentication framework defined by IEEE 802.1X 
and EAP is the most relevant when implementing APSS. 
The next section gives more detail regarding this frame-
work and is followed by the implementation details for 
incorporating APSS in IEEE 802.11 security. 
Figure 2. APSS
4.1. EAP and 802.1X 
The 802.1X standard provides a framework for authentica-
tion in Ethernet based networks [12]. The main principle 
of 802.1X is that there is a protected resource and that a 
user can only access this resource by successfully authenti-
cating with an authentication server. In the terminology of 
802.1X the pro-
tected resource 
is called a con-
trolled port. 
There are three 
entities (see Fig-
ure 3): 
• Supplicant; this is the role played by a device request-
ing access to the controlled port. In the figure this is a 
PDA called A. Authentication takes place between the 
Supplicant and Authentication Server. 
• Authenticator; this is the role played by an access 
point in 802.11. The controlled port protects a certain 
resource (for instance: the Internet in hotspots). The 
Authenticator forwards authentication messages from 
the Supplicant to the Authentication Server. The con-
trolled port becomes available to the Supplicant after a 
successful authentication. 
• Authentication Server; this role is responsible for per-
forming authentication decisions. Authentication deci-
sions are generally made with the help of user data-
bases, but this is not necessary. The Authentication 
Server can only be reached through the Authenticator. 
A secure connection between the two is expected. 
802.1X Is strongly linked to the EAP protocol; it specifies 
the use of this protocol for all authentication messages. 
EAP is developed to encapsulate authentication data trans-
parently. In theory any two-party authentication protocol 
can be implemented using EAP messages. Authentication 
data is carried by means of challenge/response messages. 
Several different authentication protocols have been im-
plemented in EAP. These EAP implementations have be-
come standards themselves and have been assigned a type 
field in the actual EAP standard. Examples of these im-
plementations are EAP-TLS (TLS handshake), EAP-MD5 
(password challenge), PEAP (tunneled authentication by 
Cisco) and EAP-SIM (SIM card authentication). 
4.2. A virtual authentication server 
Applying APSS to a Wi-Fi environment requires it to 
make use of the 802.1X framework and EAP messages 
described above. This is not as straightforward as one 
might think. 
The IEEE 802.1X framework consists of 3 entities. These 
are the Supplicant, the Authenticator and the Authentica-
tion Server. It becomes clear that 802.1X does not fit per-
fectly when applying these principles to APSS, as there are 
four parties involved in APSS: the two nodes, the hotspot 
access point and its authentication server.  
For convenience reasons, this paper refers to the two at-
tendees of the conference as Alice and Bob. According to 
the IEEE 802.1X standard, the controlled port of the Au-
thenticator is only accessible after a successful EAP. In the 
considered scenario the controlled port indicates secure 
communication between Alice and Bob; a successful au-
thentication in APSS should open up the controlled port 
and thus make it possible for secure data exchange. Be-
cause of this, Bob and Alice respectively have to attain the 
role of Supplicant and Authenticator. The hotspot access 
point however already plays the role of Authenticator in 
normal operation of the network. It is desirable for the 
hotspot access point to retain this role so the access point 
does not need a software update. The Authentication 
Server in APSS is of course the server managing the cus-
tomer database (with the credentials of registered users). 
A creative solution is required to overcome the incompati-
bility of APSS with 802.1X and EAP. The key to finding 
the solution is that the specifications of 802.1X and EAP 
do not specify any particular Authentication Server im-
plementation. This is done deliberately for reasons of 
flexibility. This flexibility makes it possible to design a 
customized Authentication Server. By using a novel idea, a 
virtual Authentication Server, it is possible to overcome 
the Authenticator problem. In this case, both node B and 
the hotspot access point have the Authenticator role. It 
does not create any problems though, because the APSS 
process is split up in two 802.1X structures, where the 
Authentication Server in the first 802.1X structure emu-
lates a Supplicant communicating with the second 802.1X 
structure (Figure 4). 
The problem with the Wi-Fi standards is thus solved. The 
Authenticator of Bob communicates with an Authentica-
tion Server that is also located on Bob’s device. This Au-
thentication Server is a piece of software that starts up a 
Supplicant session (still on Bob’s device!). This Supplicant 
then communicates with the second Authenticator in the 
hotspot access point. The virtual Authentication Server in 
Bob’s device resumes the first 802.1X session as soon as 
the second 802.1X instance is successfully concluded. Al-
ice never even notices that this EAP type is fundamentally 
different than the commonly used ones. 
Figure 3. IEEE 802.1X
Figure 4. A virtual authentication server
A virtual Authentication Server solution described above 
can be used for any authentication protocol consisting of 
three entities. This applies therefore mainly to key estab-
lishment protocols like Kerberos and Otway-Rees as these 
protocols involve two nodes and a KDC. 
A solution with a virtual Authentication Server and two 
EAP methods actually requires the node with the virtual 
Authentication Server (Bob’s device in the scenario) to 
have link layer associations with two different devices at 
the same time (ad-hoc mode with Alice’s device and infra-
structure mode with the hotspot access point). This is not a 
common thing to do, but could be done in a energy con-
suming way by using two wireless network cards. How-
ever, an application also exists to perform so-called asso-
ciation switching using only one network card. The appli-
cation keeps track of the state of each of the associations 
and switches between them, because only one association 
is allowed to be active at any time [13]. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RELATED WORK 
Access Point Security Service is a service that is able to 
provide a shared secret between two nodes that do not 
share a security relationship a priori. The difference be-
tween existing approaches is that APSS makes use of the 
existing security relationships between users and network 
providers. This existing security is used to create a new 
security relationship between the two nodes. APSS has 
been implemented for the Wi-Fi link layer.  
A demo has been prepared to show the concept of APSS in 
a Wi-Fi environment. The demo consists of two distinct 
parts. The first test shows the necessity of security in wire-
less communication; eavesdropping on unsecured commu-
nication is simple and not easily detectable. The second 
test proves that APSS is able to provide security to the vul-
nerable wireless communication; eavesdropping is impos-
sible after APSS has been applied to protect the wireless 
communication. 
The solution described here solves the same problem as the 
solution described in [14]. The difference between the two 
approaches though is that the latter solution modifies the 
EAP framework by adding new types of EAP messages. 
The virtual Authentication Server presented in this section 
does not require any modifications to the Wi-Fi and au-
thentication standards, which is an advantage. 
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